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HUMAN SANITARY WASTES AND WASTE TREATMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 
David J. Tonjes 
Christine O’Connell 
Omkar Aphale 
R. Lawrence Swanson 
Abstract 
Henry Hudson first sailed to New York harbor 400 years ago.  Since then, New York City 
has both affected and been affected by water quality in greater New York Harbor.  In this paper, 
we focus on sewers, sewerage, and sewage treatment in Manhattan and their effects on the 
Hudson River.  It is clear that feedbacks among drinking water quality and quantity, population, 
public perceptions, regulations, and estuarine water quality exist, although their strength and 
character have varied over time.   
Early land uses damaged local water supplies found on Manhattan Island.  New York then 
began to exploit the large fresh water resources available to its north, which helped the City to 
expand more rapidly.  Water availability also allowed for water carriage sanitary practices, 
increasing discharges of wastes through a growing sewer network into local waters.  The 
discharge of wastes degraded water quality, affecting natural resources in the harbor.  Untreated 
wastes led to disease from contaminated seafood, and also more generalized effects on public 
health.  Overall, New York lifestyles became largely detached from its shoreline, partly due to 
the industrial character of the waterfront, and partly because of odors and visual blight from 
pollution.  Growing public distaste over poor harbor water quality, especially in the early 20th 
century, led to some sewage treatment.  More and more comprehensive treatment followed 
regulatory and legal actions, beginning in mid-twentieth century.  Concurrently, maritime 
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commerce declined, and the waterfront became underutilized.  However, in the twenty-first 
century, natural resources are recovering, and New York City citizens once again flock to the 
shores of the Hudson River, to new and revitalized parks, new areas of development and older 
areas undergoing transformation, and into the harbor, now largely cleaned of its fouling from 
sanitary waste disposal.  Today New York City public life has a much greater orientation toward 
the waterfront, which certainly was fostered by improved harbor water quality, and the 
opportunities for growth that were available with the disappearance of the City’s maritime 
industries.   
Thus, there has been a complicated relationship between the City and its rivers and harbor.  
One aspect has been continuing use of local water bodies as receptacles for wastes, which has 
benefitted those living in the City.  Gaining these benefits has had continuing costs, however.  
Marine resources were damaged and some were lost, and quality of life on land was affected.  
Trying to undo the impacts, which has required great effort and much capital, has been hampered 
by technology decisions that appear suboptimal with the advantage of more than 100 years of 
hindsight.  Still, modern sewage treatment, initiated by local efforts and concerns, but spurred on 
to completion by the forces unleashed by the great environmental awakening of the 1960s and 
1970s, has made it possible for the citizens of New York to again fish, boat, and even swim in 
City waters. 
New York, Drinking Water, and Population Growth 
In 1609, Manhattan had several large ponds and some streams, predominantly fed by 
groundwater.  Drinking water of good quality was thus available (Sanderson 2009).  As the 
population of the City grew, the common practices of the day led to impacts to the shallow 
groundwater system and associated surface water bodies.  Human sanitary wastes, for instance, 
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were managed through permeable and solid wall privies.  The first regulations regarding 
acceptable design for these devices were promulgated by the Dutch in 1657 (Loop 1964).  The 
preferred and approved design was for impermeable pits, although it is understandable that not 
all privy pits proved to be water tight.  In addition, there was no organized management of solid 
wastes.  These were disposed onto streets, or into marshes, ponds, and other low-lying areas 
where fill might create more usable land, and sometimes directly into the surrounding waters of 
the Hudson and East Rivers (Melosi 1981).  These practices affected local drinking water quality 
(Koeppel 2000).   
Continuing increases in population (and population density) created greater impacts on local 
water supplies.  Human wastes from privies, solid wastes, and wastes from various businesses 
and industries were directly disposed in bodies of water that also supplied drinking water. 
Wastes released into the subsurface directly contaminated groundwater-fed wells, and indirectly 
affected surface water bodies through groundwater discharges.  The effects became greater in 
degree and geographical scope as the population growth rate increased in the mid-1700s (by 
1800 the population of Manhattan exceeded 50,000) (Fig. 15-1) (data from Goldman 1997, Loop 
1964, Burrows undated, New York City Department of Planning undated).  Continued growth of 
the City was thought to be threatened by potable water shortages and the absence of a water 
system capable of supporting fire suppression.  Entrepreneurial efforts to provide water from 
outside of the developed area of the City, and to construct distribution networks, were therefore 
encouraged by the City, beginning about the time of the Revolutionary War.  The Manhattan 
Company, for instance, built a small reservoir around 1800 (this company is better known for 
being used by Aaron Burr for political purposes).  Other small systems were also constructed, 
but the need for a City-wide system was recognized by both City and State governments.  The 
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State Legislature chartered the Croton Aqueduct Board in 1833, and the Croton Aqueduct was 
completed in 1842, along with a nascent distribution network that radiated from the central 
reservoir at 42nd St. and 5th Ave.  The Croton system could deliver up to 75 million gallons of 
water each day to the City, although subscribers for home delivery were slow to be added at first 
(most still took water from central distribution points such as fountains and hydrants) (Koeppel 
2000). 
Fig 15-1 placeholder: put around here 
This development unleashed an unforeseen effect, an outgrowth of the perception of an 
unlimited water supply, and the development of new technologies to manage human septic 
wastes.  These changes meant population growth no longer impacted City drinking water quality, 
but, rather, increasingly affected water quality in its surrounding water bodies.  This was the 
result of the installation of sewers, and changes in their use. 
Sanitary Waste Management in the 1600s, 1700s, and early 1800s 
Dutch colonists began to recreate familiar urban infrastructure from Holland within 25 years 
of settling New Amsterdam, including street gutters to convey storm water to nearby rivers, and 
canals.  The first true underground sewer was created under the English in the 1680s when the 
Broad Street Canal was covered over.  In 1703, it was classified as a “common sewer” – a portal 
for many sources of waste water, which was to be managed by local government.  Common 
sewers were intended to be used only for storm water, not human wastes (Loop 1964). 
Sewer construction continued through the 1700s as impervious surfaces increased (Loop 
1964).  At first, sewering was an entirely private enterprise, where open trenches were dug to the 
closest shoreline, but by the middle of the century the trenches were replaced by underground 
pipes.  These pipes were made both of wood and fired clay.  Clay pipes needed to be pre-formed, 
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and were less expensive when many were fabricated at one time.  Wooden pipes were easier to 
create for custom jobs, but required greater skill to fit lengths together (Goldman 1997). 
By the 1800s formal procedures were established for new sewer construction.  The applicant, 
generally a group of landowners in a particular area, would petition for a project to the City 
Common Council.  The Common Council would hold a hearing to determine if there were 
objections from other residents to the proposed sewer.  If objections were limited, the Council 
would approve the project.  The construction process included the City soliciting bids and then 
contracting for approved materials and labor from private sector sources.  The City used 
municipal staff to oversee construction.  The participating property owners were billed following 
project completion for all contract costs (Goldman 1997).   
Thus, underground piping was installed unsystematically, usually only in wealthier 
neighborhoods.  Sometimes, multiple pipelines set down in the same street.  Until the 1840s, 
these sewers were intended to drain storm water from property, or sometimes to dewater 
groundwater; human sanitary wastes were explicitly banned (Goldman 1997).   
Impermeable cesspits continued to be the preferred means of managing human wastes.  
Household wastes were collected in chamber pots, or from enclosed water closets, and brought to 
these cellar or backyard structures (Loop 1964).  Wastes were cleaned from the cesspits as 
needed, although these intervals were widely spaced, because water-carrier technologies for 
wastes were not used.  The contents of the pits were only human wastes; other organic materials, 
such as kitchen wastes and household slops, were managed separately.  Thus, the cesspits were 
much slower to fill than would be the case today.  Wastes collected from cesspits were 
sometimes dumped into the closest river.  At times, the City contracted with collection 
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companies so that cesspit wastes could be sold as fertilizer.  These contracts specified that the 
City would make sure wastes were set out curb side for collection (Goldman 1997).   
By the late 1700s, it was fairly clear that the privy system had not protected drinking water 
supplies from contamination (Koeppel 2000).  However, it was not until 1820 that City 
government formally took notice of soil pollution from privies, and the associated pollution of 
groundwater drinking supplies (Loop 1964).   
Waste Crisis Caused by Abundant Water 
The Croton Aqueduct began delivering water to Manhattan in 1842 (Koeppel 2000).  
Unlimited, widely distributed water radically changed sanitary practices and led to a waste 
management crisis.  Water closets and sinks had been rare because City regulations forbade the 
use of sewers for sanitary wastes.  A mechanism to enforce this ban was that all household lines 
were required to have screens where they connected to street sewers, thus creating barriers to the 
transport of solid materials.  Also, it had been difficult for most households to provide enough 
water to make “water carriage” systems practicable.  However, with seemingly unlimited water 
supplies, installation of these household technologies was rapid.  Although flush toilets were not 
invented for another 25 years, large quantities of household water now made it possible to carry 
human wastes away from living quarters rapidly and efficiently.  This, in turn, quickly 
overwhelmed the holding capacity of privy systems (Melosi 2000).  Therefore, in defiance of 
City regulations, many homeowners connected their new waste lines to household storm water 
sewers.  Only three years after the opening of the Croton water system (1845), new regulations 
allowed sanitary wastes to be sent through sewer systems.  This led to a 50 percent expansion of 
sewers over the next decade, installed through the permit process discussed above.  Thus, some 
streets had multiple lines, and others had no service (Goldman 1997).   
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Relatively few of the effluent pipes were extended as far as the end of the piers that 
surrounded lower Manhattan, and so wastes were discharged close to shore.  This enhanced 
sedimentation in the berthing areas, and led to accumulations of wastes along the shoreline and 
in and around ships.  Regulations in 1849 ordered outlet extensions to open waters to try to 
minimize these shoreline impacts.  The regulatory revisions, however, did not address other 
technological issues such as the grates on household lines, right angled turns that clogged with 
solids, and over-capacity pipes lacking sufficient gradients to flush, especially when battling tidal 
ebb and flow.  These unaddressed problems led to many odor and overflow problems in the early 
sanitary sewers (Goldman 1997). 
Although the City had regulated sewers and managed their use since the late 1600s in various 
ways, it was not until 1870 that the City assumed ownership and complete responsibility.  This 
change was part of a general reform of City institutions, but also it was in response to public 
health concerns.  The perceived need to convey wastes away from people grew as the miasma 
theory of disease gained wider acceptance (“miasmas,” or vapors and gasses, were the cause of 
illness, and septic wastes clearly emanated vapors).  In addition, in poorer areas of town, 
tenements still dumped sanitary waste water directly onto streets, because there had been no 
private enterprise to install sewers (Goldman 1997).   
As a result, sewers were extended into many parts of Manhattan, and the existing pipe jumble 
was simplified.  Many outfalls were extended and otherwise modified to try to address shoreline 
issues (Goldman 1997).  Manhattan privy counts fell from 15,000 in 1875 to less than 1,000 in 
1891.  Still, much work remained in older sections of the City, so that when the subway building 
boom in the early 20th century occurred, another priority was to rebuild the sewers downtown 
(Loop 1964). 
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Few complaints regarding harbor water quality near Manhattan were recorded until well after 
fresh water supplies began to become unpotable from pollution in the 1700s (Koeppel 2000).  
However, there is indirect evidence that sewers, and the septage emanating from them, caused 
disagreeable water quality, even before human wastes were allowed to be disposed through 
them.  Throughout the early 1800s, some new sewers were opposed at public hearings; testimony 
was presented on odors and explosions.  In the 1830s, the design of outfalls was codified to 
encourage flushing by tides.  In 1841, certain industries were forced to disconnect from the 
sewers, because the sewers they used impacted local air quality and discharged especially 
objectionable wastes.   
The use of sewers for human wastes increased shoreline impacts.  When the Common 
Council considered this change, among the comments was a concern for impacts to shoreline fish 
populations if there was insufficient tidal flushing.  By 1849, complaints from residents led to 
new rules requiring outfalls to be extended past the pier line.  In 1864, “pools of decomposing 
animal and vegetable offal” were described at the shoreline and by 1870 sewage created “white 
stringy slimes” and gray films near the shore (Goldman 1997).  In 1875, the New York Herald 
opined it was “fallacious to assume that the discharge of sewage to rivers was borne away to the 
ocean” (Loop 1964). 
Another source of contamination to the City’s surface waters was garbage and other solid 
waste.  Before the 1860s there was no organized, municipal solid waste collection system.  Then, 
the City began to experiment with various schemes to harness entrepreneurial skills.  These early 
efforts never entirely succeeded, mostly because they depended on implementing grand, 
complicated technologies.  Although they all eventually failed, most of the companies removed 
some of the solid wastes accumulating at residences, businesses, and on streets.  It was not until 
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late in the century that City management of solid waste removed this loading from the storm 
waters that ran into the sewers, and then into the harbor (Miller 2000). 
The City’s animal populations, including pigs which ran free eating trash, cattle, oxen, and 
especially horses, also contributed to the pollutant loading on City streets.  Some of these wastes 
were collected from streets for household gardens, but the remainder washed into the storm 
sewers.  The number of horses per person increased with the introduction of street cars in the 
early 1800s, and again with expansions of freight transport in the middle portion of the century, 
due to growth of railroads (McShane and Tarr 1997).  This led to there being more than 125,000 
horses in the City around 1900 – 1 for every 25 people (Tarr and McShane 2005).  Each horse 
produced 15 to 30 pounds of manure and a quart of urine each day, and only lived 2 to 3 years.  
It was easier to remove a horse when it could be disarticulated after rotting a little (Morris 2002); 
thus, even when dead, horses continued to affect the quality of urban run-off.   
The Impacts Increase and Reach a Nadir 
In the late 1800s, the population growth rate (Fig. 15-2), housing densities, and 
industrialization of Manhattan increased, causing growing effects on harbor water quality from 
additional waste waters.  In 1891 beaches and open waters were called “unsightly” and the 
“stench was unbearable.”  Proposed re-routing of sewage outfalls from the Passaic River in New 
Jersey to New York Harbor caused the New York Legislature to create the New York Pollution 
Commission.  In 1906, it found that the harbor was “heavily polluted,” with navigation obstacles 
and “local nuisance conditions,” because dispersion and diffusion of sewage was incomplete.  
There were only three small chemical precipitation plants for the wastes of 10 million people in 
the harbor basin.  The Commission found that dissolved oxygen levels throughout the harbor 
were insufficient to support oxidative degradation of wastes (Loop 1964).   
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Fig 15-2 placeholder: put around here 
The New York State Legislature created the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission in 1906 for 
follow-up work, replacing the Pollution Commission.  The Sewerage Commission thoroughly 
described water conditions, qualitatively and quantitatively.  The harbor above the Narrows was 
called “dangerous to health,” local nuisance conditions were “innumerable,” and several 
waterways were “open sewers.”  Impacts included declines in fisheries and shellfisheries so that 
the Commission advocated abandonment of the local oyster industry.  There was also 
contamination of municipal baths (which were located along the shore and which used the 
ambient river and harbor waters).  Visible garbage, offal, and solid matter were present 
throughout the harbor.  The waters of the harbor generally were found to be discolored, turbid, 
effervescent, oily, and odorous (Loop 1964).   
The Commission found that a dissolved oxygen concentration of 3 milligrams per liter (mg/l) 
was a critical concern (Loop 1964).  There is some evidence that low dissolved oxygen 
concentrations were affecting fish populations (Limburg et al. 2006), because low dissolved 
oxygen levels make it impossible for fishes and shellfish to respire (US Environmental 
Protection Agency 2000).  In addition, it was understood that if the harbor was to provide waste 
treatment, higher oxygen levels were important because aerobic decomposition of matter is much 
more efficient than anaerobic decay processes, and so as oxygen levels decreased there was less 
biological decomposition of wastes (Loop 1964).  There was such robust debate, however, on 
whether to enshrine the 3 mg/l level as a standard that no official action was taken. 
Entangled in the debate over the point to establish a standard, and associated with the 
survival of fishes and other macro-organisms, was the issue of defining water quality impacts 
based on saturation concentrations or absolute concentrations of dissolved oxygen.  Some 
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declines in absolute oxygen levels result only from seasonal or tidal changes in temperature and 
salinity that limit the amount of oxygen the water can contain.  In the early days of the twentieth 
century, one proposed indicator of major water quality impacts was depletion of dissolved 
oxygen to 50 percent of saturation.  Impacts to this level were measured in some parts of the 
harbor (the Harlem River, parts of the East River, and certain embayments) in summer sampling 
conducted at and around 1910, but generally most areas were not impacted to that degree (Loop 
1964).  Conditions worsened, however, and the lowest dissolved oxygen levels were measured in 
the late 1920s through the mid-1930s (Suszkowski 1973).   
The Metropolitan Sewerage Commission advocated for waste treatment, because it was clear 
that sections of the harbor, such as the lower East River, could not reach adequate waste 
treatment in situ.  The level of treatment would have to be sufficient to support desired end uses 
of the water bodies.  An interstate commission to administer the plans was recommended, as 
problems crossed state lines, and activities in New York affected New Jersey, and vice versa.  
No comprehensive action followed, so that although mitigations were prescribed before the First 
World War, conditions continued to deteriorate into the 1920s as the City grew and discharges 
increased.  In 1925, co-incident with the imposition of national standards, New York State closed 
all shellfish beds (Loop 1964) (New Jersey kept some areas open but under strict supervision).  
By 1928, the five-year, running average of summer, bottom-water dissolved oxygen was only 35 
percent of saturation for Hudson River monitoring stations.  Hudson River and inner harbor areas 
reached the lowest dissolved oxygen values then, although water quality in the East and Harlem 
Rivers continued to decline into the mid-1930s (Suszkowski 1973).   
Some actions to provide treatment were made in the 1920s.  Screening plants in Manhattan 
removed gross contamination from nearly 20 percent of 150 million gallons of Manhattan 
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sewage each day, and nine other screening plants operated elsewhere in the harbor.  These 
screening plants removed the more visible indicators of waste discharges.  In doing so, they 
improved aesthetics slightly and also removed some of the organic matter formerly loaded into 
the waters (Loop 1964).   
As of 1930, nearly 1.5 billion gallons of sewage were discharged from the City and other 
areas fronting on New York Harbor, receiving no treatment, except for the fraction treated by 
screening plants.  Thus, there were solids and visible turbidity traceable to sewage throughout the 
harbor, and slack waters were gassy and black.  The City Department of Health banned 
swimming from the mouth of the harbor northward throughout its jurisdiction (Loop 1964).  The 
population of Manhattan leveled off and began to decrease about this time (Fig. 15-2), because 
of changes in immigration law, the early stirrings of suburbanization, and the Great Depression.  
Smaller numbers of people in Manhattan, coupled with greater waste treatment levels, signaled 
the end of the long declining trend in water quality, because septic waste generation is generally 
proportional to population. 
Modern Sewage Treatment 
Modern treatment methods for sanitary wastes brought about the recovery of water quality 
measured in the latter part of the twentieth century, although it took more than 50 years to build 
enough facilities to cover all of New York City.  Wards Island was the first.  Its construction 
begun in 1931, but it did not achieve full operational status until 1937, because of City financial 
difficulties caused by the Depression (Gould 1951).  Ward’s Island was designed to use 
“activated sludge” technology (Loop 1964), which is the predominant process in use at large 
sewage treatment plants in the 21st century.  Activated sludge treatment generally results in 80 
percent less consumption of oxygen in receiving waters affected by effluent (biological oxygen 
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demand, BOD), and approximately 80 percent of dissolved and settlable solids are also removed 
(total suspended solids, TSS).  This level of treatment level is known as “secondary treatment,” 
because it employs a biological process as well as the physical process screening and settling 
solids from sewage (Nathanson 2007).   
In 1936, the Interstate Sanitation Commission (ISC) began to regulate sewage impacts on the 
harbor.  With Wards Island beginning to operate then, the City was treating 13 percent of its 
sewage flow, removing about 1 percent of the total amount of dissolved solids in influents 
Citywide (treatment levels were so low because most waste water being treated was only being 
screened).  By the beginning of World War II, with a total of three plants online, treatment 
resulted in 32 percent of dissolved solids were being removed (Loop 1964).   
In 1948, Congress updated the 1899 Federal Rivers and Harbors Act (which prohibited the 
dumping of garbage into navigable waterways).  This allowed the US Public Health Service to 
monitor and assist in situations where there was interstate pollution, and authorized financial 
assistance to municipalities that voluntarily participated in such programs (Melosi 2000).  It gave 
an impetus for the City to sign an “order on consent” with the ISC to “virtual[ly] eliminate 
pollution” in Class A recreational waters by 1953 (Loop 1964).  New York State had codified 
uses of waterways, and created differential water quality standards to allow those uses, meeting 
another of the goals of the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission.  In New York State, “Class A” 
waters were the “highest and best” use waterways, suitable for fishing, swimming, and 
shellfishing.   
The reform of sewage treatment financing accomplished in 1950 was a breakthrough, 
essential as a means for the City to fund its plans.  A dedicated funding source was created by 
explicitly linking sewage fees for system users to water usage.  Although the measurements of 
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water use were only approximate, based on building size and tenancy (until water meters were 
required in the 1990s), sewage plant operational monies, and, more importantly, capital expenses 
for plant construction, had been made independent of other City taxes and fees.  Five new major 
projects, expansions at other plants, and upgraded sewer infrastructure were quickly 
accomplished, because construction bonds were no longer limited by City debt limits (Gould 
1951, Loop 1964). 
Later in the 1950s, the City had difficulty meeting all requirements set by the ISC.  Industrial 
waste water inputs resulted in plant process failures, because secondary treatment requires 
healthy microorganisms, and many of the chemicals dumped into the municipal sewer system by 
factories were toxic.  Newtown Creek, the largest plant constructed in New York, used 
“modified aeration treatment,” a less effective process than full activated sludge treatment used 
in an attempt to reduce plant size and overall construction costs.  Newtown Creek, as a result 
does not achieve the standard 80 percent reductions in BOD and TSS (Loop 1964) and has been 
targeted for an upgrade ever since it began operations in 1967 (construction began in the middle 
2000s) (ISC, 2009). 
In 1972, Congress passed the landmark 1972 Clean Water Act amendments.  An important 
element of the Act was a requirement that all discharged sewage needed to meet secondary 
treatment levels for BOD and TSS (with very few exceptions).  Over 50 percent of waste waters 
discharged to open waters in New York City already met the standard, and 75 percent of City 
waste waters regularly treated because of the previous 40 years of effort (Gross 1974). 
New York City’s fiscal crisis of the 1970s prevented completion of its sewage treatment 
system immediately following the 1972 legislation.  This meant that for many years a large 
proportion of discharged City waste waters did not meet standards.  In the 1980s, the last two 
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large City treatment plants, North River and Red Hook, were built.  General upgrades and 
expansions of the systems meant all of the City (except for parts of Staten Island) have sanitary 
sewers.  The wastes from sewered areas, with the exception of those treated by the Newtown 
Creek plant, all receive secondary treatment (Brosnan and O’Shea 1996).   
In 2009, there were a total of 14 sewage treatment plants in New York City (Fig. 15-3, 
adapted from Swanson et al. 2000), nine of which discharge to the inner harbor and the Hudson 
River, or tributaries to the inner harbor such as the East River and Kill van Kull (Adamski and 
Deur 1996) (Table 15-1) (Tonjes 2005).   
Fig 15-3 placeholder: put around here 
Table 15-1.  New York City Wastewater Treatment Plants (directly or indirectly 












Wards Island 1937 1937 1998 275 
Bowery Bay 1939 1942 1973 150 
Tallman Island 1939 1939 1976 80 
Hunts Point 1952 1952 1979 200 
Owls Head 1952 1952 1995 120 
Port Richmond 1953 1978 1979 60 
Newtown Creek 1967   2009* On-going 310 
North River 1986 1991 1991 170 
Red Hook 1987 1989 1990 60 
*Upgrades to full secondary treatment were to be completed by February 2009 (ISC, 2009) but 
no official notice of the project completion could be found 
 
 
Water quality was still not good in 1980s in the H, as illustrated by average summer 
dissolved oxygen concentrations less than 4 mg/l some years, and generally high fecal coliform 
bacteria counts.  Fecal coliform, used an indicator of human pathogen contamination, decreased 
geometrically at the 42nd St. monitoring point in the river as the North River sewage treatment 
plant became operational in 1985-1986, for instance (Fig. 15-4).  (Swanson et al. 2000).  Fecal 
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coliform concentrations are reduced partly due to the biological activity of a sewage treatment 
plant, but primarily because of disinfection practices at the plant outfall (Nathanson 2007).  
Dissolved oxygen concentrations for bottom waters just south of the North River treatment plant 
improved as the plant increased its treatment level through the late 1980s (Swanson et al. 2000) 
(Fig15-5).  Generally, similar trends are found across almost all New York City waters, because 
all dry weather flows go through sewage treatment plants under normal operating conditions, 
engineering improvements and regulatory reforms on discharges are in place, and the City has 
made a clear commitment to other practices that result in improved harbor water conditions 
(Brosnan and O’Shea 1996, NYCDEP 2009). 
Fig 15-4 placeholder: put around here 
Fig 15-5 placeholder: put around here 
Chronic Problems 
Much municipal infrastructure is maintained and kept in good operating order.  However, 
this ensures it never requires replacement or is supplanted by newer models, even though it was 
built to outmoded designs.  Much important infrastructure is never determined to be “obsolete,” 
and required to be replaced.  Therefore, early, long-lived decisions result in technology lock-ins 
where changes to meet new conditions or address uncovered problems are difficult to implement.   
For instance, there was debate in the 19th century over whether to install separate storm water 
and waste water sewer systems, or keep the combined approach.  Combined sewers had a 
perceived economic benefit, because separate systems required installing two sets of pipes.  A 
specific analysis for Memphis, Tennessee, after the Civil War actually forecast slightly lower 
costs for the separate sewer systems.  Most public health advocates also favored separate 
systems.  Separate sewers resulted in smaller pipes, and especially for sanitary systems, less 
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airspace in the pipes (large pipes were needed for combined systems to manage unusual storm 
events on top of the daily production of septic wastes).  The miasma theory of disease, which had 
more adherents than the competing germ theory, was based on vapors and gases transmitting 
illness.  Vapors and gases could be minimized in the septic sewers if the pipes were smaller and 
better fitted to typical volumes, and it was anticipated storm sewers would mostly be empty 
(except when it rained).  Despite these analyses that seemingly favored separate systems, New 
York like all other large eastern North American cities (including Memphis) chose to stay with 
combined sewers, even as it greatly expanded its system (Melosi 2000).   
Combined sewers presented technical and economic problems as treatment plants came on 
line, as it was impractical to size plants to meet maximal flows.  Generally, plant designs called 
for a capacity of two times dry weather flow (Loop 1964).  Thus, small amounts of rainfall lead 
to diversions of flow.  As little as 0.1 inch of heavy rain can cause diversions of sewage in 
modern-day New York City (New York City 2007).  One report prepared for the New York City 
in the 1960s estimated that as much as 30 percent of annual loadings associated with sewage may 
bypass treatment because of wet weather overflows; although the report claimed it only rains 
three percent of the time in the northeast United States, wet weather causes outsized effects 
because storm water carries its own pollutants and washes out accumulated sedimentation (Loop 
1964).  Thus, water quality tends to be better in many areas of the harbor in drier summers 
(Tonjes and Swanson 2001a), which can be a factor especially in interpreting long-term trends 
for fecal coliform (such as Fig. 15-4).  For the past 75 years, the City has faced the challenge, as 
combined sewers were connected to treatment plants, to create enough capacity during wet 
weather to store the combination of human waste water and storm water to allow treatment after 
rains end (IEC 2009).  One incremental step was to adopt water conservation programs in the 
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1990s, which reduced influents by nearly 20 percent and allowed for storm water treatment rates 
City-wide to exceed 50 percent (Swanson and Tonjes 2001b).  By 2000, the City estimated that 
60 to 80 percent of all wet weather flows in Manhattan were treated (Swanson and Tonjes 
2001a).   
Eutrophication of coastal waters is most often associated with effluents discharge (Cleorn 
2001).  Eutrophication problems in Long Island Sound have been closely tied to New York City 
waste water nutrient releases (Long Island Sound Study 2008).  Nutrient removal from waste 
water is well-understood, and the technology is well-tested (Nathanson 2007).  However, space 
limitations at existing City sewage treatment plants, and cost projections that range from $500 
million to several billion dollars, have made the City slow to implement these additional 
treatment steps (Andersen 2002).   
Solids in sewage are removed from the influent, but this creates a solid waste (sewage 
sludge) which then requires disposal.  The City relied on ocean dumping to mitigate sewage 
sludge disposal effects on local waters.  The wastes were first dumped 12 miles southeast of the 
harbor entrance until the 1980s.  In 1986, a site 106 miles southeast of the harbor entrance was 
adopted, and it was used until 1992, following the passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act.  The 
ban on ocean dumping of sewage sludge has resulted in additional treatment of sludge in the 
treatment plants to make the sludge more amenable to transport by truck.  This sludge 
dewatering resulted in approximately 30 percent more nitrogen loadings in plant discharges, 
which makes the task of overall nitrogen removal that much more difficult (Swanson et al. 
2004).  This increase in nitrogen releases in the 1990s probably contributed to some areas 
continuing to experience low dissolved oxygen concentrations, particularly in western Long 
Island Sound (Wilson et al. 2008).  There is no mention of nitrogen removal in the 
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environmentally-oriented, twenty-year “PlaNYC” (New York City 2007), although in 2010 the 
City reached an agreement with the Natural Resources Defense Council to implement nutrient 
removal at its four Jamaica Bay treatment plants (NRDC 2010). 
Sewage also has contributed to poor harbor sediment quality and toxicity.  This affects the 
literal base of the marine food chain (Long et al. 1995).  Concentrations of contaminants in the 
water column, especially metals, have declined (Sanudo-Wilhemy and Gill 1999).  The Clean 
Water Act specified that generators of industrial effluents needed to pre-treat wastes prior to 
release into sewer systems.  Pre-treatment programs have been very effective.  In addition, New 
York City has a “track-down” program – painstaking efforts to find the source of metals in plant 
influents by testing in the sewer lines.  When sources are determined, modifications of practices 
follow to eliminate the inputs (Swanson et al. 2000).  Removing contamination inputs is one 
element in the overall program to remediate harbor sediments. 
Recently, advances in analytical chemistry have allowed the detection of “organic waste 
water contaminants” (OWCs) in aqueous samples, including pharmaceuticals and personal care 
and other household products that are not entirely degraded in waste water systems.  The 
concentrations of most OWCs are well below therapeutic levels, so that direct human health 
concerns appear to be unlikely (Benotti et al. 2009.  However, OWCs have caused endocrine 
effects in marine organisms, because many are hormonally-active substances, or are functionally 
similar to them.  Measured impacts include gravely skewed sex ratios or developmental 
problems in fishes where concentrations of these compounds are highest (Sumpter 1995).  
Treatment does not affect certain OWCs, and may in fact make some compounds more potent 
endocrine disruptors (Auriol et al. 2005).  Endocrine system responses and changes in those 
responses have been measured in fishes exposed to New York City effluents (Todorov et al. 
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2002).  In areas like the harbor that receive so much sewage effluent, it is probable more effects 
will be detected as analyses continue.  Thus, it is likely that OWCs will come under more 
regulation, leading either to societal changes to reduce influent quantities or major treatment 
process modifications. 
One intent of the Clean Water Act is to restore “biologic integrity” to impacted waterways 
(Karr 1991), and it seems unlikely that harbor ecosystems will ever be restored to that degree.  In 
practice, compliance with regulations is determined by measuring water quality indicators, a 
process assumed to ensure ecological quality.  Most water bodies that are not used as drinking 
water supplies have routine indicator testing for the two obvious measures of water quality: 
dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform, and most of New York Harbor, under average conditions, 
now meets standards.  However, complete compliance with water quality regulations requires 
that all regulated contaminants conform to regulated levels.  Routine comprehensive testing is 
rarely required due to the costs; if such testing were made regularly, it is unlikely that the harbor 
would ever achieve full compliance, because of contaminated sediments, continuing combined 
sewer overflows under wet weather conditions, and the inability of standard sewage treatment to 
remove nutrients and many OWCs. 
Polluted River Impacts on New York City 
The focus thus far has been on the impact of people on the river, and not the effect of the 
impacted river on City residents.   The colonial-era settlers of New York ate local shellfish and 
fishes.  Diamond Jim Brady was famous for his oversized oyster feasts and the City was also 
well known for other seafood (Boyle 1969).  But by the mid-1800s, pollution of the harbor had 
brought disease, typhus and cholera.  As early as the 1860s New York death rates were 
documented to be higher than other cities with better sewers, an indirect indictment of the effect 
21 
of rising pollution of an important food source (Melosi 2000).  By 1900, people were able to 
make connections among water pollution, shellfish, and intestinal illnesses, and so harbor 
fisheries declined (Andersen 2002).  Still, at least some City residents continued to exploit 
available resources, and Robert Boyle made a vivid, unsettling description of striped bass fishing 
at the 42nd Street untreated sewage outfall in the 1960s, with fish being caught and eaten despite 
“an oily flavor” (Boyle 1969). 
Maritime businesses were certainly aware that sewer effluents caused shoaling, and nuisance 
odors and other aesthetic concerns.  Wood waste gathered from the harbor around 1900 often had 
an inch or more of accreted sewage on it, an illustration of potential effects (Loop 1964).  
Certainly the luxury passenger lines with dockage at West Side piers in the mid-20th century 
must not have relished collecting upscale passengers while nestled in among the raw sewage 
outfalls there (these outfalls were used into the 1980s, and still serve as outlets for untreated 
wastes when the system receives too much rain today). 
Sewers affected everyday life in the City, from earliest times.  Odor complaints were raised 
in the 1830s, and shoreline odors disturbed residents enough in the 1840s that the matter was 
brought to the Common Council (Goldman 1997).  In the early 1900s, the Metropolitan 
Sewerage Commission decried “objectionable conditions” in the harbor, making it clear that 
citizens were disturbed by how bad water quality was.  Activities such as sanitary bathing and 
recreational swimming in City rivers were banned (Loop 1964). 
Although the overall lack of residential or recreational use of the waterfront was mostly due 
to commercial appropriations, there was, for example, growing residential development along the 
East River at Tudor City and north in the 1930s (Loop 1964), including luxury apartments such 
as the River House at East 52nd St., which was said to be the “best apartment house” in the City 
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when it was built (Bower 2009).  This kind of development was said to be an added impetus for 
sewage treatment (Loop 1964).   
By 1936, as reported by Loop (1964), the need for treatment was justified because of 
“common standards of decency,” such that citizens along the waterfront should not be exposed to 
recognizable human wastes.  In the 1940s, the ISC had a clear goal to recover City waters for 
boating, fishing, and even shellfishing and swimming (Loop 1964).  With the development of a 
comprehensive sewage treatment system, most waters in the City met dissolved oxygen and 
pathogen standards by the 1990s (Swanson et al. 2000).  Fish populations and other marine life 
had made notable recoveries (Waldman 1999), and there have even been pilot programs to try to 
restore oysters in some areas of the harbor (Swanson and Tonjes 2001a). 
Advancing levels of sewage treatment have clearly coincided with decisions to expand 
waterfront uses and access for both City residents and visitors.  Growing citizen distaste with the 
condition of New York City water quality led to municipal action; the potential for further 
improvement has continued to change perceptions.  Urban waterways are no longer considered 
suitable for untreated waste or as treatment facilities.  As water quality improves, potential use of 
the shoreline and waters increase.  And, as more people use and appreciate the shoreline, there is 
more support for programs that increase the scope of use of the harbor.  In the 1960s and 1970s, 
newspaper stories about swimmers or kayakers or fishers in New York City waters were novelty 
feature items.  Now these activities, while not commonplace for most New Yorkers, are widely 
advertized, and no longer qualify as news. 
As commercial use of waterfront areas has declined, projects like Battery Park City and the 
South Street Seaport have received much attention and achieved commercial success, and areas 
such as Battery Park, Riverside Park, and the Brooklyn Promenade have regained lost luster 
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(Freudenberg and Pirani 2007).  Although New York still is not a city like Paris or London 
where its riverside is an essential part of its image and appeal, there is growing awareness of the 
magnificent New York shoreline.  This appreciation will grow as the Hudson River Park 
develops, and water-oriented construction, especially along the West Side, continues.  New York 
City has already rezoned (or is planning to rezone) most of the west side waterfront and the 
shoreline along the Harlem River to increase densities and mixed residential-commercial uses, 
for instance (New York City 2007).  It is difficult to imagine these projects being pursued if there 
were not effective treatment of the City’s wastes.  Nonetheless, although PlaNYC discusses the 
need (and State requirements) to upgrade capture rates and decrease the generation of stormwater 
to reduce the amount of untreated sewage released under wet weather conditions, it does not 
address the potential for additional treatment of nutrients or OWCs (New York City 2007). 
Conclusions 
In its earliest days, the relatively small population of New York City could manage wastes 
and minimize impacts to the environment, especially key natural resources that people depended 
on for daily life.  As the population grew, however, waste management practices especially 
impacted important water resources.  Declining drinking water quality and increasing demand 
for water supplies forced the City to create a distribution system based on supplies from outside 
its own borders.  The availability of the harbor as receiving waters for wastes, with tides and 
currents that made many of the wastes “disappear” as they were discharged, made it a natural 
catchment for the great increase in waste water disposal needs that occurred with the public 
water distribution system in the 1840s.  The use of stormwater sewers for sanitary wastes 
alleviated impacts on people from growing pollution levels around their dwellings.  However, 
the increasing City population increased its use of sanitary sewers, and the associated waste 
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burden on harbor waters.  Although it was slow to be recognized, eventually this waste loading 
also affected human health, albeit not enough to slow City growth rates. 
The long rehabilitation of the harbor only began when public distaste for its degradation 
forced the initiation of waste treatment.  Although New York began work on its sewage 
treatment system before many other American cities, its slow progress (50 years of construction 
following 30 years of planning) appears to be an indictment of the degree its citizens were 
disengaged from its shoreline.  City engineers deserve credit, however, for once the plants began 
to be built, the selected technologies reached treatment levels that were not mandated until the 
Clean Water Act was passed in 1972.   
Although Manhattan is an island, for much of the 20th century it had few public spaces and 
little public activity along the banks of its rivers; waterfront uses were largely restricted to 
shipping and related commerce.  But these vast industries declined, and by 2000 they had 
essentially vanished.  As water quality has improved, perceptions of the harbor have changed 
from a waste receptacle to a natural resource (once again).  Certainly, many more elements of 
New York life, such as parks and recreation, include the harbor and there is much recent 
commercial and housing redevelopment, replacing empty and underused spaces that appeared as 
the maritime industries withered away.  The malodorous, fouled waters of the harbor circa 1920 
would not support the civic life that now is found using the recovering shoreline.   
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